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Is Apple Playing Fair? 
Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy 
By Nicola F. Sharpe* and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On April 2, 2007, Apple Inc. and EMI Music held a joint press conference in 
London that may be the harbinger of significant changes in the digital music arena.1  This 
press conference, whose attendees included EMI Group CEO Eric Nicoli and Apple CEO 
Steve Jobs, unfolded in an environment of significant technological and commercial 
changes in the music industry.  The shift to the digital era has been a turbulent one for 
many players in the music industry, particularly as a result of the widespread distribution 
of unauthorized digital music files and the concurrent significant decline in record 
industry sales.2  The Apple-EMI agreement permits Apple to sell EMI Music’s entire 
digital music catalog without digital rights management (DRM),3 which represents a 
significant shift from the previous policy of the major record companies.  Such 
companies have until this point typically required that music distributed in digital form 
include DRM restrictions on use and copying.4 
¶2 The Apple-EMI announcement should be considered in light of the recent 
developments in the broader digital music market.5  Apple has in many respects played a 
pivotal role in those developments, transforming itself from a technology company to an 
entertainment company with its core strength in the sale and distribution of digital 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.  B.A. Cornell University; J.D., 
M.B.A., Yale University.  Email: n-sharpe@law.northwestern.edu. 
**Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.  A.B., Harvard College; M.A., Ph.D., 
University of California, Berkeley (Anthropology); A.M., University of Michigan (Applied Economics); 
J.D., Harvard Law School.  The authors would like to thank Paul Heald, Steve Ramirez, Max 
Schanzenbach, and Jamelle Sharpe for their comments and for inspiring us to expand this project.  Any 
errors, of course, are ours alone.  Email: o-arewa@law.northwestern.edu.  © 2007 Nicola F. Sharpe and 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa. 
1 EMI Group Press Release, EMI Music Launches DRM-Free Superior Sound Quality Downloads Across 
Its Entire Digital Repertoire, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.emigroup.com/Press/2007/press18.htm; Apple Inc. 
Press Release, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, Apr. 2, 2007, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html. 
2 See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Interoperability, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare: Is the 
Apple iPod Changing its Tune? (2007) (manuscript on file with authors). 
3 See EMI Group Press Release, supra note 1; see also infra notes 26 to 32 and accompanying text. 
4 With a few notable exceptions, such as Sony Rootkit software, which was anticopying software installed 
on certain Sony CDs that also secretly collected security information from computers playing the CD, 
music content contained on physical CDs has generally not been subject to DRM or other protective 
measures to prevent copying.  See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
5 See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text. 
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music.6  Apple derives its strength from the iPod portable digital music player, which is 
currently the world’s dominant digital music device.7  Apple has also become one of the 
largest sellers of musical content in the U.S.8  Although Apple has now agreed to 
distribute music from the EMI catalog without DRM, many believe the technological 
choices that Apple has made in the past surrounding DRM technology have laid the 
foundation for Apple’s market dominance.9  Until now, Apple has facilitated its market 
dominance by deliberately limiting interoperability with non-Apple devices and non-
Apple online music stores for iPod device and iTunes Music Store (“iTMS”) users.10  
From a technology perspective, this bundling11 of the iPod with iTMS has been made 
easier by virtue of Apple’s FairPlay DRM, which limits usage of music purchased from 
iTMS.12  Apple’s bundling of the iPod and iTMS, which together form a network, has led 
to lawsuits against Apple alleging antitrust violations ranging from tying to attempted 
monopolization; some foreign jurisdictions have gone so far as to threaten to ban certain 
Apple technologies on consumer protection grounds.13  This type of legal pressure has 
likely played a role in Apple’s decision to sell digital music without DRM in partnership 
with EMI.14 
¶3 The technological choices that Apple has made in developing the iPod and iTMS 
raise difficult questions about the emergence of new technologies, the development of 
markets for innovative products, and how existing legal frameworks, including 
intellectual property and antitrust laws, should deal with new technologies and new 
 
6 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, Music’s New Gatekeepers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at W1 (noting that 
Apple is now one of the largest sellers of music in the U.S.). 
9 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
10 The iPod controversy highlights potential ambiguities in uses and understandings of the term 
interoperability, particularly with respect to consumer devices.  Interoperability may refer to technological 
possibility, which might exist if any potential consumer could make a device interoperable.  Under this 
view of interoperability, devices might be characterized as interoperable despite the fact that only 
technologically sophisticated consumers are able to interconnect the devices.  Alternatively, interoperability 
may refer to devices that are “plug and play,” where even technologically unsophisticated users are easily 
able to interconnect devices.  These differences in uses and understandings of the term interoperability are 
evident in the iPod/iTMS controversy, where Steve Jobs sees Apple’s products as already interoperable 
with those of competitors.  In contrast, the lawsuits against Apple and assertions from European regulators 
make different assumptions about what constitutes an interoperable device.  The understandings of the term 
interoperability by plaintiffs in lawsuits and European regulators are based on assumptions about what 
should constitute an interoperable device, based at least in part on both the ability of users of average 
technological sophistication as well as the number of intermediate steps that might be required to 
interconnect devices.  Discussions of interoperability in this article reflect the varied uses of the term in 
different contexts but do not always identify the specific derivation or explicitly identify the assumptions 
made about interoperability in particular instances.  For further discussion of this point, see Sharpe & 
Arewa, supra note 2.   
11 While economists and some U.S. courts at times use the term “bundling” and the term “tying” separately, 
this article will use the terms interchangeably.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION 103 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf (noting that 
the term bundling “typically refers to a sale in which products are sold only in fixed proportions,” whereas 
the term tying is typically used when the portions are not fixed.  “Case law in the United States sometimes 
uses the terms ‘tying’ and ‘bundling’ interchangeably.” (citations omitted)). 
12 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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innovations.  To address these questions, this Article examines the iPod/iTunes network 
and argues that while innovation, intellectual property laws, and network effects may in 
part explain Apple’s market dominance, consumer welfare should be taken into account 
in legal assessments of the iPod/iTMS bundle, as well as the competitive market 
consequences of Apple’s bundling.  Specifically, where new technologies once increased 
the choices available to consumers, growing recognition exists today that such 
technologies may now unnecessarily constrain consumer choices.15 
¶4 This Article lays out the topography of the Apple FairPlay controversy, looking 
closely at the business and market environment within which the iPod/iTMS network 
arose.  This Article does not seek to draw conclusions about the legal status of the 
iPod/iTMS network under existing laws.  Rather, it outlines some ways in which existing 
legal frameworks may be applied to the structures and behaviors associated with 
companies’ development of technological and business innovations.  Part II discusses the 
iPod device, the iPod/iTMS bundle, and the broader business, technology and cultural 
context within which the iPod and iTMS were deployed.  Part III analyzes the antitrust 
allegations against Apple and examines Apple’s behavior and success in light of the 
network effects produced by the iPod/iTMS bundle.  In conclusion, Part IV identifies 
some questions courts should contemplate when considering the competitive concerns 
raised by issues connected to technology choices such as those relating to FairPlay DRM 
in the context of networks such as iPod/iTMS. 
II. THE APPLE IPOD AS A BUSINESS, CULTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PHENOMENON 
A. The Apple iPod Success 
¶5 The iPod is an extremely successful product that has generated significant revenue, 
visibility, and positive publicity for its creator Apple Inc.16  The iPod has become a 
pervasive product in the digital era.  Over one hundred million iPods have been sold,17 
which demonstrates the success of the device as a cultural, business, and technological 
phenomenon.18  The iPod also reflects Apple’s facility in business, marketing, and 
product design.19  The success of the iPod was, however, by no means inevitable.  Apple 
did not have a first-mover advantage, yet it quickly garnered market share and emerged 
as the dominant player in the market for digital music, digital video, and digital media 
players.  Since its launch, the iPod has become the dominant digital music player with a 
market share in excess of 70%.20  Apple recently changed its name from Apple 
Computer, Inc. to Apple Inc., which represents its recognition that its future business 
 
15 Carlisle George & Navin Chandak, Issues and Challenges in Securing Interoperability of DRM Systems 
in the Digital Music Market, 20 INT’L REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 271, 272 (2006) (noting the existence of 
multiple incompatible digital music file formats today). 
16 See STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: HOW THE IPOD SHUFFLES COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND 
COOLNESS 2 (2006) (noting that the term success falls far short of describing the iPod phenomenon). 
17 Apple Inc. Press Release, 100 Million iPods Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html. 
18 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
19 Jessie Scanlon, Apple Sets the Design Standard, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 7, 2007, available at 2007 
WLNR 341835. 
20 Apple Financial Results Conference Call, Jan. 17, 2007, 2:00 PM PST at 3:35-4:03, available at 
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/qtv/earningsq107 (noting that Apple iPod market share in the U.S. for 
MP3 players was reported to be 72% by NPD with faster growth in international markets). 
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endeavors are unlikely to be limited to computers.21  The success of the iPod is also at the 
root of potential legal problems for Apple.  Many of these potential problems relate to 
Apple’s technology choices about interoperability with respect to the iPod/iTMS network 
that have served to restrict consumer choices in important ways.22 
B. The Apple iPod Problem 
¶6 In a number of areas, the digital era has given consumers a broader range of 
choices.  The range of choices that the iPod gives consumers is a key element in it 
becoming the first digital music player to experience large-scale success.23  The iPod 
offers consumers alternative ways to experience music.24  The iPod/iTMS network, 
however, has been deliberately constructed to restrict interoperability with other devices 
and online music stores.25  Prior to the EMI announcement, Apple restricted consumer 
choices through the use of DRM and technological protection measures (TPM) for digital 
music purchased from iTMS.26  TPM are technologies intended to promote authorized use 
of digital works that play a role in DRM systems.27  DRM technologies have become 
prominent in the digital era as copyright owners have attempted to control access to and 
uses of their works through technological measures such as encryption.28  The concerns 
of copyright owners in the digital era led to the passage of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA),29 which imposes legal restrictions on circumventing DRM.30  
While such restrictions do not prevent DRM from being hacked,31 they give copyright 
owners a potential legal weapon that may be used in a variety of ways, including 
anticompetitively.32 
 
21 See Apple Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000110465907012760/a07-5119_18k.htm (noting that 
Apple amended its bylaws on February 14, 2007 to reflect the Company’s recent name change to Apple 
Inc.). 
22 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
23 Paul Thurrott, With iPod Success, Apple Takes “Network Effect” from Microsoft, WindowsIT Pro, Nov. 
1, 2004, http://www.windowsitpro.com/Article/ArticleID/44376/44376.html?Ad=1 (noting the success of 
the Apple player, despite the relative advantages of other players with respect to price, storage, and battery 
life). 
24 See generally LEVY, supra note 16. 
25 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
26 Id. 
27 See Ian Kerr, If Left to Their Own Devices . . . How DRM and Anti-Circumvention Laws Can Be Used to 
Hack Privacy, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 167, 167-71 
(Michael Geist ed., 2005), available at http://iankerr.ca/content/view/22/70 (noting legislative reforms that 
use the law to further enable DRM and facilitate its implementation as a primary means of enforcing digital 
copyright).   
28 Id. at 171.  This article does not discuss many significant issues raised in discussions of DRM and TPM, 
including issues relating to privacy and questions of control.  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 
(1996). 
29 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) (codified in 
scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code). 
30 Id. at § 1201(b); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 830-45 (2001). 
31 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
32 Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 
Interoperability, 62 WASH. & L. REV. 487, 489-90 (2005) (discussing some implications of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act for commercial competition in cases where producers of printer cartridges try to 
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¶7 Apple uses FairPlay DRM to control redistribution of the digital music purchased 
through iTMS.33  FairPlay enables Apple to administer specified usage rights for iTMS 
music purchases.34  Prior to the EMI announcement, all music sold through iTMS used 
FairPlay DRM, which is a variant of Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) technology, for 
playback on the iPod and computers.35  Through FairPlay DRM, Apple has effectively 
limited interoperability between iTMS and non-iPod players and the iPod player and 
digital music stores other than iTMS.36  Apple has actively tried to prevent others from 
creating interoperable products, as is evident in the Apple response to RealNetworks 
Harmony technology.37 
¶8 Apple’s use of DRM has led to accusations against Apple that FairPlay is an 
anticompetitive constraint on consumer choice.38  Such constraints reflect significant 
areas where the iPod limits consumers to fewer choices than some commentators feel 
should be offered, particular with regard to the ability of consumers to play digital music 
purchased from music stores other than iTMS on their iPod devices.39  The 
interoperability restrictions have made Apple the subject of increasing criticism, threats 
of legal action, and actual legal action connected to interoperability restrictions associated 
with FairPlay DRM.40  The adoption of interoperable solutions in the digital music arena 
is thus made more difficult on account of both current legal frameworks and the business 
strategies of dominant market players.41 
¶9 The iPod business model and Apple’s use of FairPlay DRM raise a number of 
potential legal questions, including how existing legal frameworks such as intellectual 
property and antitrust laws can be adapted to the business and technology models of the 
digital era.42  Further, Apple’s adoption of FairPlay DRM limits consumer choices.  Such 
limitations are ironic since the iPod’s success has in part been based on the choices it has 
offered consumers with respect to their consumption of music.  The choices the iPod has 
given music consumers in the digital era are a clear contrast to those offered by existing 
 
suppress competition using the provisions of the DMCA); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 
UCLA L.  REV. 1095, 1110-14 (2003) (discussing uses of the DMCA intended to suppress competition). 
33 See Adam L. Penenberg, Digital Rights Management: How Apple, Microsoft, and Sony Cash in on 
Piracy Prevention, SLATE, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2130300 (noting that a song purchased 
on iTunes is kept on the purchaser’s hard drive as an encrypted file that is unlocked with a random 
encryption key supplied by Apple and that Apple limits how consumers can use the file; also, noting that 
consumers cannot distribute the digital file over the Internet or play it on anything other than iTunes or an 
iPod, but that consumers can burn unlimited CDs and load the song on up to five computers and an 
unlimited number of iPods). 
34 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2; George & Chandak, supra note 15, at 274-75 (describing the iTMS rights 
model). 
35 See AAC Audio, http://www.apple.com/quicktime/technologies/aac (noting that all music sold in iTMS 
uses AAC technology); Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 





41 George & Chandak, supra note 15, at 282 (“The strong legal protection enjoyed by DRM systems 
currently deters any commercial circumvention devices to aid consumers.”). 
42 This article will focus on the nature of the Apple iPod/iTMS network while considering the antitrust 
allegations against Apple.  It will not focus to any significant degree on issues relating to intellectual 
property. 
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players in the music industry.  The iPod’s success is thus based in part on its solution to 
the problems faced by the music industry in the digital era.  
C. The Problem the iPod Solved 
¶10 The digital era created problems for existing music industry business models and 
the role of the traditional recording industry as an intermediary.43  Prior to the digital era, 
the recording industry exercised control over both the creation and distribution sides of 
the recording industry.  On the creative side, the music industry exercised significant 
control over music creation and distribution.44  Much of the power of the music industry 
derived from the importance of music distribution for musical artists.45  Through its 
control of distribution, the music industry was thus able to exercise significant power 
over the artists whose music it distributed.46  On the consumer side, the recording 
industry constrained consumer choices through a bundling model.47  As a result of 
bundling music on CDs and the limited ability of consumers to obtain individual songs 
from such CDs,48 consumers were required to purchase unwanted music in order to obtain 
the music they desired.49 
¶11 The creation of digital formats such as the MP3 compression standard,50 combined 
with the distribution mechanism of the Internet, has revolutionized the creation, 
distribution, and consumption of music.51  Digital music has reduced the ability of the 
recording industry to control distribution and creation.  Digital technology enables artists 
and consumers to make choices that previous industry business models may have denied 
them.52  The convergence of digital music formats and Internet distribution enabled 
consumers to unbundle their music purchases.53  Much of this unbundling was 
 




47 See Kevin Zhu & Brian MacQuarrie, The Economics of Digital Bundling: The Impact of Digitization and 
Bundling on the Music Industry, 46 COMM. ACM 264, 264 (2003), 
http://web.gsm.uci.edu/kzhu/PDFfiles/Papers_Abstract/CACM_DigitalBundling_p264-zhu_published.pdf 
(“Bundling can be very effective as both a profit-maximizing tool and as a competitive weapon . . .”). 
48 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
49 LEVY, supra note 16, at 44 (noting that with the advent of the CD, which “ripped the needle across the 
surface of the LP age,” artists had a full hour to fill with no natural breaking point when the listener could 
flip over a record, which resulted in extra space being filled with second-rate offerings). 
50 David Hesmondhalgh, Digitalisation, Copyright and the Music Industries, in UNPACKING DIGITAL 
DYNAMICS: PARTICIPATION, CONTROL AND EXCLUSION (Peter Golding, & Graham Murdock eds., 2006), 
available at http://www.cresc.ac.uk/publications/documents/wp30.pdf (discussing MP3 compression 
standards). 
51 Tom McCourt, Collecting Music in the Digital Realm, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 249, 250 (2005) 
(“[P]opularity of MP3 files and related formats . . . indicates that access and convenience are increasingly 
more important than artifact and sound quality.”). 
52 Jesse Bockstedt, Robert J. Kauffman & Frederick J. Riggins, The Move to Artist-Led Online Music 
Distribution: Explaining Structural Changes in the Digital Music Market, PROC. 38TH HAW. INT’L 
CONFERENCE SYS. SCI. 1, 7 (2005), available at 
http://misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullpapers/2004/0422_091204.pdf (“Digital music providers act as 
product/service providers by dealing directly with the end customer.  The emerging digital music market 
supports dramatically reduced production and distribution costs.”). 
53 Zhu & MacQuarrie, supra note 47, at 265 (“Recently, however, digital formats have forcibly unbundled 
the CD.  Online, consumers can now purchase custom CDs containing only songs they wish to purchase, 
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accomplished through the use of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing networks such as 
Napster, whose users increased from zero in June 1999 to 20 million in July 2000.54  P2P 
file sharing emerged as the recording industry was experiencing a significant decline in 
music sales.55  Although the recording industry has tended to place the blame for 
declining record sales on illegal downloads,56 other studies suggest a range of potential 
factors,57 including saturation in the CD market,58 P2P downloads, and other factors.59 
¶12 The recording industry and its principal lobbying arm, the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA),60 have managed to develop a comprehensive litigation 
strategy for dealing with the implications of unauthorized digital downloads.61  This 
litigation strategy and the prevention of unauthorized digital downloads on which it is 
based have contributed to the shape of business models in the digital era, although 
innovative business models in this area have largely come from outside of the traditional 
music business players.62  The recording industry has consequently not developed 
effective business strategies for confronting the implications of the digital era.63  Its 
failure to adjust to the business realities of the digital era left room for companies such as 
Apple to develop business models that created legal means by which consumers could 
purchase digital music.  The interactions between technology players and content owners 
in the digital era underscore the ways in which the music industry has been slow to adjust 
to the conceptual and business realities of digital music and its broader implications.64  In 
contrast, Apple and other players in the digital music arena created innovative digital era 
business models.  Apple, for example, makes little money from sales of digital downloads 
 
and eventually digital distribution will mean that consumers might desire individual songs rather than 
albums.”). 
54 Bockstedt et al., supra note 52, at 9. 
55 Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music 50-60 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 11282, 2005), available at 
http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/499.pdf (discussing declining music industry CD sales). 
56 See RIAA.com, What the RIAA is Doing About Piracy, http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last 
visited May 25, 2007); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record 
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPE31618PDF (noting that the RIAA blames declining 
record sales on unauthorized file sharing). 
57 Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra note 56, at 3 (concluding through empirical analysis that file sharing 
has an effect on music sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero); Connolly & Kruger, supra 
note 55, at 50-60. 
58 Hesmondhalgh, supra note 50, at 3. 
59 Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, at A1 
(discussing factors underlying decreasing music sales, including the closing of many retail outlets where 
music could be purchased). 
60 LEVY, supra note 16, at 23-24 (describing the arguments of the RIAA, the lobbying and legal arm of the 
recording industry, with respect to digital music). 
61 Id. at 27-31 (describing digital era music lawsuits by the RIAA in response to different technologies); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php (last 
visited June 6, 2007). 
62 Smith, supra note 59 (discussing the advent of innovative niche record stores). 
63 LEVY, supra note 16, at 31-32 (describing music industry digital music services, including Pressplay and 
MusicNet, and describing such services as “pathetic, half-hearted efforts”); Connolly & Kruger, supra note 
55, at 60-61 (noting the efficiency of P2P distribution networks and the likelihood that the business model 
for the distribution of music will change dramatically in the future). 
64 LEVY, supra note 16, at 27-50 (illustrating the gulf between technology industry players in the Silicon 
Valley and music industry players in Hollywood in the digital music era). 
Vol. 5:2] Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa 
   339
on iTMS.65  Apple instead makes significant profits from the iPod.66  It is probably not an 
accident that purchases from most other digital music stores cannot easily be played on 
the iPod.67  Apple’s strategy of deliberate non-interoperability prevents other digital 
music players from accessing iTMS and protects Apple’s iPod franchise.  
¶13 The Apple iPod and iTMS business model helps free consumers from previous 
recording industry constraints such as CD bundling.  At the same time, however, the 
iPod/iTMS solution for digital downloads imposes a new bundling configuration that 
limits consumer choices.  The constraints imposed by Apple FairPlay DRM are of 
concern to a range of consumer advocates, particularly in Europe.68  The iPod is currently 
the most successful device that provides alternatives to illegal downloads.  As the iPod 
has increased in popularity, however, the effects of Apple’s technology choices on 
current and prospective Apple competitors and consumers have raised legal questions.  
Specifically, consumers and government agencies in the U.S. and Europe have 
challenged Apple’s business model on antitrust grounds.69 
III. APPLE, ANTITRUST ALLEGATIONS, AND NETWORKS 
¶14 Antitrust laws seek to protect consumer welfare by preventing anticompetitive 
practices, such as the illegal use or maintenance of monopoly power.  A firm, however, 
does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws when the monopoly power it possesses is “a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”70  For many 
firms, the chance to extract monopoly rents may provide an incentive to innovate and 
take risks that stimulate economic development.71  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
noted that “[t]he mere possession of monopoly power and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system.”72   
¶15 Apple is the clear market leader in the online digital music space.  Apple’s position 
as a market leader therefore raises questions as to whether Apple’s success is the result of 
a superior product or business acumen, the willful maintenance of monopoly power 
through anticompetitive practices such as unlawful tying facilitated by Apple’s FairPlay 
DRM, the skillful development of technology products, the exercise of intellectual 
property rights, or some combination of these factors.    
 
65 Wingfield & Smith, supra note 8 (“Apple isn't under as much pressure to squeeze profits from iTunes 
because of the money it makes on iPods.  In fact, it earns little from iTunes after paying fees for the music 
and credit-card processing.  iTunes typically pays major labels about 72 cents a track, while it pays most 
independent labels around 62 cents.”). 
66 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
67 Id. 
68 An extensive literature exists concerning the implications of DRM generally.  See supra notes 27-32 and 
accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
70 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).   
71 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
72 Id. 
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A. The Apple iPod/iTMS Network 
¶16 One way to explain Apple’s success is through a network lens.  Networks are 
characterized by products that increase in value to consumers to the extent that the 
products are widely adopted.73  This is known as a “network effect.”74  Network effects 
may be direct or indirect.75  Telecommunications networks are the most recognizable 
network subject to direct effects.  A telephone becomes more valuable to the owner as 
more households install telephones, broadening the network of individuals that can be 
contacted with the device.  An indirect network effect, on the other hand, is one where 
the increased network value results in greater consumer demand for complementary 
products and greater consumer demand for complementary products increases the value 
of the network.  For example, as more households purchased VCRs, the demand for 
movies on videocassettes increased,76 as did the demand for ancillary business services 
such as video rentals.  Similarly, as more consumers demanded movies on videocassettes 
the value of VCRs to their owners increased.       
¶17 The Apple network is an excellent example of a network with indirect effects.  The 
interconnected nature of various Apple products and services is an important part of 
Apple’s business strategy.  Apple’s success in advancing this strategy is evident in the 
effects from the iPod and iTMS network.  An iPod’s primary function is to provide 
digital media content, serving as a device for viewing, listening to and storing that 
content.  iPod owners derive benefits from the ease with which the iPod interconnects to 
a personal computer and iTMS. 
¶18 Arguably, users of both the iPod and iTMS have experienced the benefits of 
network effects.  One benefit, interoperability between iTMS and the iPod, allows 
customers to perform a broad spectrum of tasks using Apple’s iTunes software 
application.  iTunes “allow[s] customers to preview, purchase, download, organize, share, 
and transfer digital content to an iPod” and their computer.77  Moreover, as more iPods 
are sold, third parties develop more add-ons, expansions, and compatible products, 
further increasing the value of the network.78  According to Apple’s 2006 Annual Report, 
 
73 See George Priest, Flawed Efforts to Apply Modern Antitrust Law to Network Industries, in HIGH STAKES 
ANTITRUST: THE LAST HURRAH? 117, 118-19 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003) (arguing that networks are thus 
different than a “hard goods industry” where “one consumer’s use of the good has little or no impact on the 
use by any other consumer”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). 
74 Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, Presentation at the Progress and Freedom 
Foundation Conference 2 (Sept. 22, 1998), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/software.pdf (arguing that “the most notable” characteristic that 
distinguishes software markets from other markets is that they “often are subject to network effects, 
whereby the value of a piece of software (e.g., an operating system) rises with the number of other end 
users who run that same software.  These effects arise both because the ability to communicate and share 
data with others will be greater, and because it is more likely that complementary hardware, software, and 
wetware (i.e., brain cells) will be available, when there is a large base of users of the software.”; also noting 
that network effects are not limited to software markets but may arise in any market). 
75 Mark A. Lemley & David MacGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
479, 481 (1998) (suggesting ways in which particular legal rules should and should not be modified to take 
account of network effects). 
76 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 96 (1999). 
77 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12 (Dec. 29, 2006). 
78 Apple Computer, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Dec. 3, 2004) (“With the addition of third-party 
iPod peripherals, the capabilities of certain iPods can be enhanced to include voice recording and photo 
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“[i]n addition to [Apple’s] iPod accessories, thousands of third-party iPod compatible 
products are available.”79  Apple iPod/iTMS network participants derive greater value as 
network size increases as evidenced by the growth in the type and number of available 
offerings.  
¶19 Networks have the potential to both enhance and inhibit competition.  A successful 
network may increase the number of choices available to a consumer.  At the same time, 
one company’s proprietary network may produce products that are not interoperable with 
technology from rivals, or it could exclude competitors entirely.  Ultimately, either 
scenario reduces consumers’ choices.  Consequently, networks present unique challenges 
to antitrust laws.  Behaviors that are traditionally viewed as anticompetitive – such as 
tying, predatory pricing and exclusive dealing – may have persuasive procompetitive 
justifications when considered from a network perspective.80  However, the same 
behaviors may have pernicious effects, such as delayed innovation, lower output, and 
higher prices.   
¶20 The ability of products to interoperate makes networks more valuable.81  This is 
particularly true in the technology arena, where the proliferation of devices, from 
computers to cellular phones, drives the need for new software applications that will 
operate on multiple devices.82  Proprietary technologies that limit interoperability to 
products within a network exclude technology from rivals, and may result in a wider 
range of choices for customers by spurring innovation as competitors develop their own 
proprietary technologies.  In this instance, each player may seek to establish a de facto 
industry standard and thus is “competing for the market.”83  Similarly, open standards 
across a market may promote competition by spurring competition for a larger share of 
the market among firms that use a common standard.84  In environments with open 
standards, consumers can benefit from both the positive externalities within a single 
 
downloading directly from certain digital cameras.”); see also Posting of Christopher Breen to 
Today@Playlist, http://playlistmag.com/weblogs/todayatplaylist/2004/12/giftweeksoftware/index.php 
(Dec. 8, 2004, 18:29 EST) (discussing numerous third-party applications for the iPod). 
79 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Dec. 29, 2006) (“In addition to the Company’s own iPod 
accessories, thousands of third-party iPod compatible products are available, including portable and 
desktop speaker systems, headphones, car radio solutions, voice recorders, cables and docks, power 
supplies and chargers, and carrying cases and armbands.”). 
80 See Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation, Affirmative Defenses, and the 
Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 3, ¶ 47 (2002) (discussing the challenges that 
technology industries present for antitrust laws, identifying affirmative defenses premised on the existence 
of network effects that Microsoft neglected to advance during the course of its antitrust case, and noting 
that “[t]here are a number of pro-competitive reasons for a tie as well, beyond the obvious economies in 
production and distribution that a tie may produce.  First, a tie may control quality.  For example, a 
manufacturer may tie the sale of repair services and parts to the purchase of its machine in order to ensure 
that it is maintained properly and that the firm's reputation for quality is protected.  Second, a tie may help 
share the risk of a product purchase or provide information to consumers about product value.  Third, a tie 
may stimulate demand for complementary products.  Finally, a tie may aid in price discrimination by 
measuring the intensity of use.”) (citations omitted). 
81 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at 33. 
82 Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
623, 634-35 (2002). 
83 SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 231 (“Precisely because standards reduce lock-in, they shift the 
locus of competition from an early battle for dominance to a later battle for market share.  Instead of 
competing for the market, companies compete within the market, using the common standard.”). 
84 Id. 
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network or from other networks and products that interconnect.85  Switching costs are 
lower, thus reducing the extent to which consumers are locked in.86  Apple’s control over 
the iPod’s and iTMS’s interoperability can, and probably has, appreciably increased the 
value of its network and is central to Apple’s alleged antitrust violations.87    
B.  Antitrust Allegations Against Apple 
¶21 In recent months, Apple has been the target of lawsuits and threats of legal action 
due to the iPod/iTMS network’s alleged noninteroperability with competitors’ products.88  
France recently enacted a law to implement the European Union Copyright Directive, 
which the American press has referred to as the “iTunes law.”89  This law has been 
characterized as forcing Apple to make its products interoperable with those of other 
companies,90 although the final version of the enacted French law contained a significant 
exception that enables companies such as Apple to continue to use DRM that restricts 
interoperability with permission of the applicable rights holders.91  Additionally, several 
consumer protection groups from Finland, Norway, France, and Germany recently issued 
a joint statement declaring that Apple should make music sold through iTMS 
interoperable with portable digital music players other than the iPod.92  The extent to 
 
85 Id. at 233. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 197 (noting that a “network is far more valuable if you can control the ability of others to 
interconnect with you”). 
88 See Complaint, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D. Cal. July 
21, 2006); Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 
2005); John Leyden, Apple faces US iTunes lawsuit, THE REGISTER, Jan. 3, 2007, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/03/apple_itunes_lawsuit/ (noting that the U.S. lawsuit “follows 
similar charges in Europe, brought by a French consumer rights group.”); Apple Inc., Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q), at 46-55 (Dec. 30, 2006) (discussing actions against Apple, including Union Fédérale des 
Consummateurs - Que Choisir v. Apple Computer France S.à.r.l. and iTunes S.à.r.l., a suit filed by a 
French consumer association in February 2005 against Apple that alleges violations of French consumer 
law by: “(1) omitting to mention that the iPod is allegedly not compatible with music from online music 
services other than the iTunes Store and that the music from the iTunes Store is only compatible with the 
iPod and (2) allegedly tying the sales of iPods to the iTunes Store and vice versa.”); Tom Braithewaite & 
Kevin Allison, Crunch Time for Apple’s Music Icon, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at 27, available at 
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?id=060613007896&page=2 (dated June 13, 2006) (“Last week, Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden said Apple must make music tracks downloaded from iTunes playable on rival 
devices or get out of their countries.  Finland is also looking at intervening.”). 
89 See generally Mikko Välimäki & Ville Oksanen, DRM Interoperability and Intellectual Property Policy 
in Europe, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 562, available at 
http://www.valimaki.com/org/drm_interoperability_final.pdf (discussing the French iTunes law). 
90 LOI n° 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de 
l'information (Aug. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=MCCX0300082L. 
91 French Bend on iTunes Law, WIRED, June 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/06/71220 (noting that the compromise text of the 
law “maintains a Senate loophole that could allow Apple and others to sidestep that requirement by striking 
new deals with record labels and artists”); France Softens iTunes Law, but Apple Still Disgruntled, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at C2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/technology/23ipod.html?ex=1308715200&en=4c03604b5706e878&e
i=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss (noting that the French National Assembly maintained “a loophole 
introduced last month by senators, which could allow Apple and others to dodge data-sharing demands by 
striking new deals with record labels and artists”). 
92  The four consumer protection groups are the Consumer Ombudsmen in Finland and Norway, the French 
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which such actions will lead to restrictions on Apple’s European business model and 
business activities remains unclear and will depend on actions taken by consumer groups 
and authorities going forward.  The threatening allegations made and legal actions filed 
against Apple highlight the nature of potential claims that might be made against Apple 
on account of iPod/iTMS bundling. 
¶22 In the U.S., two cases filed against Apple in the Northern District of California are 
currently pending.93  Both complaints allege that Apple has tied its iPod to iTMS by 
conditioning iPod sales on the purchase of digital content from iTMS, and vice versa.94  
From an antitrust perspective, Apple’s sale of iTMS content to be played on the iPod 
raises questions of whether an illegal tie actually exists.  Can Apple be guilty of unlawful 
tying when an essential element of that offense is that the sale of one product (the tying 
product) must be conditioned on the purchase of another (the tied product)?95  Is the sale 
of iTMS digital content truly conditioned on the purchase of an iPod?96  Few would argue 
that an iPod is the only way to enjoy the content purchased from iTMS.  The scope of the 
usage rights that accompany content purchased from iTMS clearly reflects the fact that 
the iPod is not the only means by which consumers may consume iTMS content.97  Many 
buyers replay digital media purchased online through iTMS and other online stores on 
their computers.  Additionally, FairPlay and other DRM protection measures can be 
circumvented to make music downloaded from any online media store, including iTMS, 
playable on a variety of portable digital music players, including the iPod.98  In the case 
of digital music files, for example, a user simply needs to make a copy of the song in a 
different format, such as MP3, and then transfer the content in that format to their music 
player of choice.99  Such transfers may, however, involve a loss of sound quality in the 
transferred digital file. 
 
Consumer Organization, UFC Que Choisir, and the Federation of German Consumer Organizations (vzbv). 
Forbrukerombudet.no, European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute Over iTunes Music 
Store, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11037079 (last visited June 7, 2006); see also John 
Oats, France and Germany Join Anti-iTunes Crusade, THE REGISTER, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/23/itunes_slagged_again (“France and Germany are joining the 
Scandinavian campaign to make content from iTunes work with players from companies other than 
Apple.”). 
93 The first domestic case against Apple was Charoensak v. Apple Computer, Inc. (formerly Slattery v. 
Apple Computer, Inc.) which contained allegations of “unlawful tying of music purchased on the iTunes 
Store with the purchase of iPods and vice versa and unlawful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
market power.”  Apple Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 30, 2006); see also Complaint at ¶¶ 60-
71, 72-75, 80-102, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 20, 2006). 
94 Complaint at ¶¶ 60-71, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 20, 2006); Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 9, 2005). 
95  See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).  But cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984).  
96 This tying allegation highlights tensions between varied uses and understandings of the term 
interoperability.  See supra note 10. 
97 See generally George & Chandak, supra note 15. 
98 Digital Music Interoperability and Availability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. n.6-7 (2005) (statement 
of Mark Cooper, Ph.D, Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/cooper040605.pdf  [hereinafter Hearings] (describing the process a 
user must go through to transfer music from iTMS to players other than the iPod). 
99 Siobhan Hughes, Apple Gets Vote of Confidence for iTunes from Antitrust Chief, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 
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¶23 At the core of both cases are allegations that Apple used technological protections 
or restrictions to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the relevant markets.  For 
instance, the Tucker Plaintiff alleges that Apple did the following to maintain its 
monopoly: 
(1) actively [modified] the iPod’s “core processor,” the Portal Player 
System-On-A-Chip, not to support WMA; (2) actively [modified] the iPod 
Shuffle’s SigmaTel chip not to support WMA; (3) [refused] to pay a 
nominal licensing fee for WMA; (4) [used] technological restrictions to 
prevent consumers who purchased [from] rival stores from playing music 
on their iPods; (5) [sold] music only using Apple’s FairPlay DRM, which 
is incompatible with any digital music player other than iPod;  and (6) 
[used] technological restrictions to prevent users from playing video files 
purchased from Apple on rival video-enabled music players.100 
¶24 Each allegation circles back to an alleged lack of interoperability between the iPod, 
iTMS and other products in the relevant markets.101  If Apple did not dominate each 
relevant market, it would lack the requisite monopoly power to support a tying claim 
based on music encoded with FairPlay DRM being exclusively interoperable with the 
iPod.  Consequently, Apple might avoid antitrust scrutiny since any prospective plaintiff 
could not allege that the sale of either the iPod or iTMS is conditioned on the purchase of 
the other.   
¶25 In response to the lawsuits and other criticisms of FairPlay DRM, Steve Jobs 
argued in a February 2007 open letter that Apple does not overly limit consumer choice.  
He stated that “it is useful to remember that all iPods play music that is free of any DRM 
and encoded in ‘open’ licensable formats such as MP3 and AAC.  iPod users can and do 
acquire their music from many sources, including CDs they own.”102  According to Jobs, 
the FairPlay DRM is necessary for Apple to ensure compliance with its signed 
agreements with the record companies.103  Apple clearly believes that in light of these 
contractual obligations, the current usage rights are the “most liberal . . . available in the 
industry for legally downloaded music.”104  
¶26 Jobs’s assertions do not necessarily convey in full the reality of the portable digital 
music player competitive landscape.  The vast majority of digital music consumers use 
the iPod as their primary digital music player and iTMS as their primary online digital 
 
2006, at B5 (quoting the Chief of the Antitrust division at the Department of Justice, Thomas O. Barnett, 
“consumers can re-record an iTunes song in an MP3 format and play it on other devices; in sum, it is hardly 
clear that they are locked in.”); see Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2 (discussing how such actions may create 
legal problems to the extent that they involve circumvention of a TPM, which may be illegal).  
100 See Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
20, 2006) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
101 For a more in depth discussion of the effects of interoperability or compatibility on price competition 
see generally Katz & Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, supra note 74. 
102 Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic. 
103 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2; see also Jobs, supra note 102 (“[A] key provision of our agreements 
with the music companies is that if our DRM system is compromised and their music becomes playable on 
unauthorized devices, we have only a small number of weeks to fix the problem or they can withdraw their 
entire music catalog from our iTunes store.”). 
104 Jobs, supra note 102. 
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music store.105  While some tech savvy users may have alternatives, for most others, their 
own technological limitations106 may mean that use of Apple’s products does not reflect a 
preference for such products.107  Instead, it may reflect a lack of choice stemming from 
high switching costs, one of which is learning alternative downloading methods.108  For 
such users, Apple may be the sole available alternative.  This lack of choice is of 
potentially greater significance due to Apple’s allegedly monopolistic behavior and 
alleged monopoly power.  
¶27 The lack of iPod and iTMS interoperability with other devices and music stores in 
the online digital music space and the consequent high switching costs have accelerated 
the market tipping in Apple’s favor.109  Network effects heighten the possibility that 
tipping may occur, resulting in a lone, dominant network, and an increased risk of 
monopolization.110  Tipping raises the possibility that practices such as tying and 
exclusive dealing, which are often used to outperform rivals, may have pernicious results.  
One such concern is that “a firm that is dominant in one market may use such practices to 
tip the market for a related product in its direction, even if its variant of that product is an 
inferior one.”111 
¶28 One tension evident from the claims against Apple is that Apple may have had 
incentives to make its network inoperable with other online music sites and other digital 
media players.112  Specifically, Apple has maintained a closed network and has refused to 
make its products interoperable with those of its competitors.113  This refusal reduces the 
likelihood that any competitor will gain enough of a foothold in any of the relevant 
 
105 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.  
106 See Hearings, supra note 98, at n.6-7 (statement of Mark Cooper) (“While iTunes allows consumers to 
burn purchased protected digital music to a CD – an open platform – it must be pointed out that a consumer 
would need to install a new program, purchase the song, burn the song to CD, rip the burned CD into a 
format their current player will understand and then enter all the song information manually – a 
cumbersome process digital music stores were supposed to make automatic . . . .  A consumer with an iPod 
and Windows might have more luck if they followed the steps in Footnote 6, but users with a Mac are out 
of luck – and won’t be able to download that song legally.”). 
107 See Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
20, 2006) (“Plantiff alleges two theories of antitrust tying: (1) Apple has used technological restrictions to 
force purchasers of Apple's iPod (tying product) to purchase only Online Music and Online Video from 
iTMS (tied product); and (2) Apple has used technological restrictions to force purchasers of Online Music 
and Online Video from iTMS (tying product) to purchase only Apple's iPod (tied product).”). 
108 Other costs would include the difficulty of identifying and acquiring the equipment, abandoning a 
familiar product where users are comfortable with the interface and functionality of the product and loss of 
any data that is not transferable to the new product.  See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 117 
(outlining various categories of switching costs including “[b]rand-specific training” which includes 
“[l]earning a new system, both direct costs and lost productivity”). 
109 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 105-
106 (1994) (describing “tipping” as “the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity 
once it has gained an initial edge.”).  
110 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 7. 
111 Id. 
112 See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 673, 682 (1999) (“[L]ack 
of compatibility can be the death-knell of a new technology, even if it is superior in some absolute or stand-
alone sense.  And incumbent firms often have the incentive to exert their intellectual property rights to deny 
such compatibility to would-be entrants.”).  
113 Apple may be retreating from this position.  See infra note 115-123 and accompanying text (discussing 
Apple’s recent announcement that it has partnered with EMI to offer some songs in DRM-free AAC 
format); see also Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
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markets to create a viable alternative network.  As a result, Apple products currently 
dominate the market for portable digital players and digital music and video content.114 
¶29 Even without DRM, Apple could continue to limit interoperability because the 
AAC file format in which iTunes encodes digital music files, by default, is not supported 
by many digital music players.115  This is important given that Jobs’s open letter has 
borne fruit.  In this letter, Jobs suggested that the recording industry “abolish DRMs 
entirely.”116  He also indicated that Apple would be willing to sell DRM-free music 
through iTMS if the music companies would license Apple to sell music without DRM.117  
Jobs noted that this solution would be “clearly the best alternative for consumers, and 
Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat.”118  Not surprisingly, shortly after this letter was 
released, Apple and EMI jointly announced that Apple would distribute some portion of 
the EMI catalog without DRM.119  The fact that EMI was the first of the big four music 
companies to sell music free of DRM is no surprise, since they are known as the 
recording industry player most eager to license and have thus far had weak online 
sales.120  In May 2007, Apple began distributing higher quality digital audio files in AAC 
format at 256 kbps, which is twice the rate of current files that are encoded in AAC 
format at 128 kbps.121  These DRM-free music files, which will cost $1.29, or 30 cents 
more than current iTMS songs, will, according to Apple, have an audio quality 
indistinguishable from the original recording.122  Tracks previously purchased from iTMS 
are upgradeable to the DRM-free file standard for 30 cents.123  Industry analysts suggest 
that the other big record labels are taking a wait-and-see attitude in order to evaluate 
whether the Apple-EMI arrangement is successful before they follow EMI’s lead.124   
 
114 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 180 (noting that rivals to Microsoft’s operating systems “[do 
not] have the critical mass to pose much of a threat”). 
115 Posting of Jenn K. Lee to anythingbutipod, EMI to Offer DRM-Free Digital Music, 
http://anythingbutipod.com (Apr. 2, 2007, 20:50 EST) (“[F]orgive us for being less than thrilled over the 
upcoming availability of more expensive music encoded in a format that few players actually support.”). 
116 Jobs, supra note 102. 
117 Id. (“The third alternative is to abolish DRMs entirely.  Imagine a world where every online store sells 
DRM-free music encoded in open licensable formats.  In such a world, any player can play music 
purchased from any store, and any store can sell music which is playable on all players.  This is clearly the 
best alternative for consumers, and Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat.  If the big four music companies 
would license Apple their music without the requirement that it be protected with a DRM, we would switch 
to selling only DRM-free music on our iTunes store.  Every iPod ever made will play this DRM-free 
music.”). 
118 Id. 
119 Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, EMI to Sell Music Without Anticopying Software – Online-Strategy 
Shift Breaks with Industry on Combating Piracy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2007, at B5 (noting that EMI is “the 
world's third-largest music company by sales after Universal Music Group and Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment . . . .”). 
120 LEVY, supra note 16, at 35 (noting that EMI is known as the most eager of the big four to license, while 
Universal, with the biggest market share, is known as the “hardliner in the digital music wars”); Hiawatha 
Bray, Apple, EMI to Revamp Online Music Offerings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2007, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/04/02/apple/?p1=MEWell_Pos5 (noting weak EMI online 
sales). 
121 Apple Inc. Press Release, supra note 1. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Laura Sydell, EMI Music Goes DRM-Free in a Deal with Apple, All Things Considered, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9293489 (“Analyst James 
McQuivey, of Forrester Research, thinks EMI’s move will allow the other music industry giants to sit back 
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¶30 Although some have applauded the Apple-EMI arrangement,125 others have 
criticized it on account of the higher price of the DRM-free files, continued use of a 
largely non-interoperable file format for encoding files, and the fact that consumer 
personal data is also apparently encoded in the DRM-free digital musical file itself, likely 
as an anti-piracy measure.126  Further, while giving consumers greater choices with 
respect to DRM, the Apple-EMI arrangement does not necessarily give consumers more 
options as their purchases may not be interoperable with dominant industry file formats, 
at least with the ease that has come to characterize Apple products.  As a result, some 
have suggested that Apple’s announcement for digital distribution of EMI’s catalog in 
DRM-free AAC format may be a sophisticated stratagem implemented to outmaneuver 
Apple competitors, including Microsoft.127  Thus, the agreement with EMI may give 
Apple an advantage when it comes to setting the dominant “open” standard for digital 
music distribution.128 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
¶31 The extent to which Apple is playing fair should be assessed from both a legal and 
business perspective.  Apple’s iPod/iTMS bundling practices and the iPod/iTMS network 
should be assessed in light of their competitive implications.  Evaluating the competitive 
impact of the iPod/iTMS bundle and other technological innovations may be complicated 
by the potential interaction of intellectual property and antitrust legal frameworks.  From 
an intellectual property perspective, greater attention should be given to the market 
impact of intellectual property rights and their exercise.  This would mean that 
considerations of intellectual property, particularly in the technology arena, should be 
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126 See Posting of Jenn K. Lee to anythingbutipod, supra note 115; Rhys Blakely, Personal Data Found 
Hidden in iTunes Tracks, TimesOnline, June 1, 2007, at 
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DRM-free music files have "embedded personal information into music files bought from its iTunes online 
music store"). 
127 Arik Hesseldahl, Apple Stokes a Digital Music Standards War, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 5, 2007, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2007/tc20070404_499334.htm (“Using AAC is 
brilliant for several reasons.  First, for Apple, whose stated market aim is to do everything in its power to 
sell more of its highly profitable iPods (and beginning in June, presumably profitable iPhones), the choice 
of AAC means more non-Apple devices will be able to play songs purchased on iTunes. . . .  But the real 
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128 Hesseldahl, supra note 127; Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2 (discussing the potential emergence of AAC 
as the default standard format for digital music). 
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attuned to any potentially anticompetitive uses of intellectual property rights.129  
Anticompetitive practices bolstered by intellectual property rights or claims of such rights 
can potentially give unwarranted market power to holders of intellectual property rights, 
impose broader social costs and hinder the innovation that intellectual property 
frameworks are intended to promote.130  Further, intellectual property rights can and are 
exercised in such a way as to have anticompetitive effects.131   
¶32 Apple’s products have to date been notable for their ease of use.132  Although the 
influence of the Apple arrangement with EMI remains unclear, during the period in 
which it has sold music protected by DRM, Apple has refused to extend its customary 
ease of use to certain iPod and iTMS specific activities.  Apple’s construction of the 
iPod/iTMS network reflects a policy of deliberate noninteroperability that makes it more 
difficult for iPod and iTMS users to use players and online music stores that compete 
with Apple’s devices and products, and thus more difficult for users to the leave the 
iPod/iTMS network.133  This policy lends support to those who argue that Apple’s 
motivations are largely anticompetitive.134  Use of DRM protected and unprotected file 
formats that are not widely used have strengthened the exclusive aspects of the Apple 
iPod/iTunes network; however, Apple’s use of DRM and the AAC file formats does not 
necessarily enhance consumer welfare.135   
¶33 Even without DRM and use of the AAC encoding format, the dominance of Apple 
might limit the market impact of potentially competitive products.  If truly competitive 
products began to emerge, Apple would be required to outperform its competitors based 
on a superior product and business acumen.  Although Apple’s performance is at present 
outstanding by many measures, the current market environment, in which Apple has few 
effective competitors, may encourage it to become complacent.  Further, under the status 
quo, Apple’s successful domination of the market for digital music players and online 
music downloads has allowed the company to sell and operate a product that may not be 
inspired to improve in quality as quickly as it might with competitors in the fray.  Further, 
Apple’s market power does not exclusively stem from positive network effects, but is in 
large part wedded to its exercise of proprietary strategies that include a significant 
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131 See Arewa, supra note 129 (discussing strategic and anticompetitive uses of intellectual property rights). 
132 Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2. 
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135 See Hilary Rosen, Steve Jobs, Let My Music Go, THE HUFFINGTON POST, May 9, 2005, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/theblog/archive/2005/05/steve-jobs-let-.html (questioning why more 
consumers are not complaining about Apple’s restrictions with respect to purchases from non-iTMS music 
stores). 
Vol. 5:2] Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa 
   349
exercise of intellectual property rights.136  In this way, Apple is not necessarily a “natural” 
monopoly, but an “unnatural” one.   
¶34 Antitrust laws consider how industry specific regulatory goals and objectives 
influence competition and business conduct in that industry.137  In networked industries, 
courts must consider “the nature of the network and the market in which it operates” 
when determining whether or not a practice is anticompetitive.138  While companies 
should not necessarily be forced to “open up [their] networks and provide interconnection 
against [their] will,”139 one important factor to consider in antitrust analysis of intellectual 
property intensive products and services is the influence of any asserted intellectual 
property rights, the scope of such rights, and the extent to which other less restrictive 
alternatives may exist.  Thus, antitrust agencies and the courts must be cognizant of the 
scope of the intellectual property rights and any unlawful extension beyond it.140  While 
conclusions cannot be drawn a priori with respect to any particular case, such factors 
should be considered in making determinations in cases involving intellectual property 
intensive products and services. 
¶35 Although the legal status of Apple’s bundling practices is presently contested, from 
a business perspective, Apple may not have learned the lessons of the potential dangers 
of bundling evident in the recent experiences of the recording industry.  Apple ignores 
such lessons at its peril.  Many commentators and industry analyst agree consumers will 
leave an exclusive network in favor of one that offers an open network compatible with a 
variety of offerings from various competitors.141  Dr. Mark Cooper, Director of Research 
for the Consumer Federation of America stated in recent testimony before congress that 
“consumers demand interoperability, and will pick it when given the choice.”142  In the 
same Congressional hearing, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas expressed the 
following: “[a]s a result of disputes like the one between Apple and Real, some have 
suggested that efforts to boost digital music interoperability should be encouraged by 
regulation or legislation.  Others have urged Congress to leave the issue to the 
marketplace and let consumers decide what it best for them.”143  Both alternatives are 
possible outcomes in the Apple FairPlay controversy.   
 
136 See Dana Blankenhorn, How Much Further Can Apple Go, Dana Blankenhorn and the War Against Oil 
Blog (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.danablankenhorn.com/2006/12/how_much_furthe.html#more (noting the 
long-standing tendency of Apple to rely on proprietary technology). 
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¶36 This Article suggests ways in which authorities making determinations of whether 
to take regulatory action in cases such as the Apple iPod/iTMS bundle can frame and 
view the iPod/iTMS network and Apple business practices within the broader market 
context.  From a legal perspective Apple’s use of AAC and FairPlay DRM may not 
fundamentally controvert existing antitrust laws.  Apple’s current bundling business 
strategy, however, may not be sustainable in the long term from a business perspective.  
Further, in many respects, criticisms of Apple DRM and use of AAC encoding reflect the 
fact that Apple may be a victim of its own success.  Because Apple and its products have 
come to define an era, some say even the twenty first century,144 significant expectations 
exist about the role that Apple should play in relation to important digital era issues.  By 
constraining consumer choices of file formats in a manner that seemingly restricts 
interoperability and that appears to be inconsistent with its ethos of enabling ease of use, 
Apple may fail to fulfill the expectations of those who believe Apple to be different, in 
line with Apple’s marketing as the anti-Microsoft or a company that is unlike many of its 
competitors.  Apple likely could enable ease of use through supporting multiple formats, 
with or without DRM, without significant harm to the iPod franchise.  The refusal to do 
so may strike some as willful blindness,145 particularly given the historical experience of 
Apple in the computer market. 
¶37 In the past, Apple’s Macintosh computer suffered the effects often seen in closed 
networks.  Although it was “highly respected for its design,” it eventually lost market 
share because “it was incompatible with other systems.”146  Only time will tell if the iPod 
and iTMS will suffer the same fate as the Macintosh computer or follow along the path of 
the recording industry, whose bundling practices did not adequately prepare it for the 
changes that occurred in the digital era.  History, however, does have a way of repeating 
itself.  Therefore, Apple, once bitten, should be twice shy and consider opening its 
network and foregoing short-term profits in the interest of long-term success. 
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